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tional Association,
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Plaintiff-Respondent
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S. CRAIG HUNTER,
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!

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs-respondents brought their action in the
lower court alleging breach of contract. Intervening plaintiff-respondent intervened. Defendant-appellant defended
and counterclaimed that he was induced to purchase securities as a result of violations of Section 61-1-22(1) (b)
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow presiding, dismissed defendant-appellant's counterclaims, and submitted the case to the Jury
on the basis of special Interrogatories. Judgment was
granted against defendant-appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant asks to have this Court reverse
the judgment of the lower court and direct entry of judgment for defendant-appellant or in the alternative, remand the case for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The plaintiffs Peter and Andrew Souvall were
the principal stockholders of plaintiffs S & F Supply
and Burger-In-The-Round (previously named Dinner Table) (R-13, Exhibit 9-D at P. 1). They were officers,
directors and members of the executive committees of
both corporations (R-26, 29, 80).
2. John Langeland, senior vice president of the intervening plaintiff, Zions First National Bank (Bank) in
charge of commercial loans, and T. Bowering Woodbury,
a vice president of the Bank, were both stockholders of
S & F Supply and Burger-In-The-Round (R-83, 84, 216,
217). They were also directors and members of active
executive committees of both corporations (R-80, 207,
208). Souvall testified that Langeland and Woodbury
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were also officers of S & F Supply Co. (R-28). The
Souvalls had obtained commercial loans from the Bank
prior to August, 1969 (R-80-84, 223).
3. In August, 1969, S & F Supply and Burger-InThe-Round obtained an additional commercial loan of
$200,000.00 from the Bank (R-36). The Souvalls personally guaranteed the loan (Exhibit 9-D at P. 3). The loan
was a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan participated in 75 percent by the SBA and 25 percent by the
Bank (Exhibit 9-D at P. 3). Various corporate and personal assets of the plaintiffs were pledged to the Bank as
collateral on the SBA loan (R-33-35). Among the assets
pledged on the loan were 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock owned by the Souvalls (R-36). Peter Souvall
was a director of Universal Leasing Corporation (R-37).
4. Peter Souvall testified that John Langeland and
Donald Bennett, one of the loan officers in Langeland's
department, assisted the Souvalls in preparing the loan
application to the SBA (R-88).
5. The business and financial dealings of the Bank
officers with the Souvalls, although required to be disclosed, were omitted from the SBA loan application (loan
application, R-144-148).
6. After only one monthly payment, the SBA loan
became in default in October, 1969 (R-92, 219).
7. The Souvalls and the Bank officers worked together to sell the collateral to pay off the SBA loan (R-39,
43, 52, 71, 98-102, 121, 126, 229, 236, 241, 259, 261, 710).
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8. In February, 1970, defendant learned that the
Universal Leasing stock held by the Bank as collateral
on the SBA loan was for sale (R-391-394).
Defendant contacted Donald Bennett at the Bank,
who told defendant that he could not give him any information unless the SouvaUs authorized it (R-183, 395396).
9. The defendant then contacted Peter Souvall who
told him the Bank had all the information on Universal
Leasing and that the SouvaUs would authorize the Bank
to deliver whatever information the Bank had to the defendant (R-183, 396). The Souvalls telephoned Bennett
and told him to give defendant whatever information the
Bank had on Universal Leasing (R-183, 396).
10. Defendant then returned to the Bank and asked
Don Bennett for the information about Universal Leasing
(R-160, 396-397, 507).
Bennett gave defendant one financial statement of
Universal Leasing (Exhibit 18-D) and claims that he
showed defendant two other financial statements (Exhibits 13-P & 14-P) (R-153, 160, 397, 398, 667).
Defendant denies that Bennett showed him anything
except one financial statement (R-507). Defendant claims
that Bennett, after giving defendant one financial statement, said "That is all the information we have" (R-513).
11. At the time of defendant's visit with Bennett,
Universal Leasing was in serious financial difficulty (P-
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604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 617, 618). Both Langeland and Bennett knew of the serious financial difficulty
of Universal Leasing (R-151-153, 672-673).
12. Defendant did not know at the time of the signing of the contract on March 9, 1970, that Universal Leasing was in serious financial difficulty (R-397-403).
13. On February 27, 1970, Bennett learned from the
President of Universal Leasing that at least one Universal
Leasing financial statement he claimed to have had was
false (Exhibit 15-P). Bennett admitted he did not inform defendant of this fact (R-184-186, 663).
14. Defendant agreed to purchase the stock held
by the Bank and was to act as a conduit for the sale of the
other assets held as collateral which were sold or to be
sold to other persons (R-48, 98-103). The Bank and the
Souvalls had already arranged for Ernie Psarras to purchase some of the assets (R-98-104, 244-245). Peter Souvall was to help sell the remaining assets (R-71, 102).
All receipts from the sale of the assets were to be delivered to the Bank to apply to the SBA loan (R-70-71,
399-400). The Bank approved and signed the contract
for the sale of stock to defendant (R-261).
15. Certain of the SBA collateral assets were in fact
channeled back to the Souvalls and to the SouvalPs attorney (R-57-58).
16. Both the contract with the defendant and the
contract with Psarras were executed on March 9, 1970
(R-101, 537). Bennett delivered the Universal Leasing
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stock to defendant and did not require a promissory note.
Bennett admitted that this was a very unusual transaction for the Bank to make (R-135). The SouvalTs attorney stated at trial that plaintiffs wanted to consummate the sale to defendant by "hook or by crook" (R742).
17. Approximately six weeks after the signing of the
contract, Bennett approached Hunter and requested Hunter to sign a promissory note in the amount of $133,500.00
as an accommodation to Bennett to satisfy the Bank examiners, which Hunter signed (R-402).
Bennett assured Hunter that he would in no way be
obligated on the note and that it was not intended to
evidence a separate obligation of Hunter (R-402).
18. In the summer of 1970, defendant discovered
that Universal Leasing was financially broke, and had
been in serious financial difficulty since the fall of 1969.
He later discovered that the Bank's officers were deeply
involved with the plaintiffs and had known that Universal
Leasing was in serious financial difficulty when the Bank
delivered him the stock (R-402-403).
19. Defendant tendered back to the Bank stock comparable to 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing (R-156,164,
522).
20. In defendant's pleadings and also at trial defendant raised the issue of whether the Bank was the agent
of the plaintiff, for the giving of information to defendant,
about Universal Leasing (See Argument Point I ) .
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21. Counsel for plaintiffs inquired extensively regarding Exhibit 7-D, the SBA loan application, in direct
testimony of their witnesses, before counsel for defendant
ever inquired about Exhibit 7-D (R-31-36). Counsel for
defendant offered Exhibit 7-D, the SBA loan application,
into evidence (R-85-87). The Judge sustained an objection on the basis of immateriality and irrelevancy (R-9091). At least twice again during the course of the trial,
both in chambers and at the bench, Exhibit 7-D was reoffered.
22. The Court refused to give an instruction on the
agency of the Bank and permitted the case to go to the
Jury on the basis of special interrogatories propounded
by counsel for plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
BANK WAS THE AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE GIVING OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNIVERSAL LEASING TO
THE DEFENDANT, AND FURTHER THAT
A PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS
AND OMISSIONS OF ITS AGENT ACTING
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THAT AGENCY.
Defendant alleged in his Answer to the Bank's Com-
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plaint that the officers of the Bank were "intimately involved as officers and/or agents in other business ventures
involving the other plaintiffs and the Souvalls, . . . and
[that] said officers were working with and assisting the
said Souvalls and were trying to induce defendant to purchase said stock . . ." (R-55-56). The testimony is uncontested that the Bank conveyed the financial information
regarding Universal Leasing to defendant only upon the
Souvall's specific instruction. The testimony is as follows:
Testimony of Bank Officer, DON BENNETT;
CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Faber:
Q. Did the Souvalls tell you that he [defendant] talked to them?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact they told you to give him whatever information the Bank had. Isn't that correct?
A. Yes (R-183).
Testimony of Defendant;
DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Faber:
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr.
Bennett?
A. At that time he just told me that I should
go out and see the Souvalls, that I would have to
discuss it with them first, and that he couldn't
give me any information unless they authorized it.
Q. Did you go to see the Souvalls?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did that meeting take place?
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A. It was either, it was right in that same
two or three day period. I don't remember if it
was the same day or the next day or — it was right
shortly after I talked to Don Bennett anyway.
Q. Did you talk to the Souvalls?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did they tell you?
A. They told me that I would have to go get
any information that I wanted on the stock, outside of the fact they were willing to sell it, from
the bank.
Q. Did they tell you that they would authorize the bank to release that information to you?
A. Yes. Called over to the bank and did
that.
Q. Did you then go back to the bank?
A. Yes (R-345-346).
Testimony of Defendant;
CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Nebeker:
Q. Now when you went to the Souvalls and
had your discussion with them about buying this
stock, did you ask them to furnish any current
financial statements?
A. When I asked the Souvalls for information on the stock, they sent me to the Bank. When
I got to the Bank, I saw Don Bennett. He gave
me a financial statement and told me that was all
the information that they had on it . . . (R-507).
From the testimony, it is clear that the Souvalls
authorized the Bank to convey the information about
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Universal Leasing to defendant. It is also clear that the
Bank only acted as a result of that authorization. Under
such circumstances, defendant was absolutely entitled
to an instruction directing the jury to determine whether
the Bank was the agent of the Souvalls for giving information about Universal Leasing to defendant. Because
of the close business association between the Bank's officers and the plaintiffs, and because of defendant's claim
that the Bank and the Souvalls failed to give him certain
critical information about Universal Leasing, it was impossible for defendant to fairly present his defense to the
Jury unless the Jury was instructed on the question of
agency.
The applicable statute holds the principal (a seller
of securities) and his agent jointly liable. § 61-1-22(1) (b)
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act states:
"Any person who . . . offers or sells a security by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person
buying the security from him, . . . Every agent
who materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as the
seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
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of the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
The testimony in this case is that the Bank had express authority from the Souvalls to divulge to the defendant whatever financial information the Bank had
about Universal Leasing. The Bank only acted pursuant
to that authority. The statute is clear that both the agent
and his principal are jointly liable for material omissions
by the agent. Defendant requested and was clearly entitled to an instruction on agency. The Jury should have
been instructed as to the legal binding effect of the acts
of the agent upon the principal. Failure to give these instructions to the Jury denied the defendant the right to
have the Jury (1) find that the plaintiffs, the Souvalls,
were liable under the Utah Securities statute for the acts
and omissions of intervening plaintiff, Zions First National Bank, and (2) find that the Bank was liable for
misconduct under the Securities statute and chargeable
thereunder as the agent of the Souvalls.
In addition, the general law of agency is that a corporation may act as an agent for an individual principal
or for another corporation. 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency",
§ 13 at page 427. Furthermore, the agency and the assent
of the parties thereto may be either expressed or implied.
3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency", § 18, at page 428. By the testimony, agency here was express (R-183). So far as concerns a third person dealing with an agent, the agent's
scope of authority includes not only the actual authorization conferred upon the agent by the principal, but also
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that which has apparently been delegated to him. Wood
v. Strevell-Paterson Hardware Co., 6 Utah 2nd 340, 313
P. 2d 800 (1957), cited at 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency", § 73,
at page 475. A principal is responsible for injury resulting
from the fraud of his agent committed during the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's
actual or apparent authority. An agent does not cease
to act within the course of his employment merely because
he engages in a fraud upon a third person. 37 Am. Jur.
2nd, "Fraud and Deceit", § 311, at pages 411-412. Clearly
the defendant was entitled to an instruction on agency as
he requested.
POINT II.
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER
COURT IN EXCLUDING FROM THE EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT 7-D, ENTITLED "SBA LOAN APPLICATION".
The evidence was that the plaintiffs and the Bank
officers were working together to liquidate the SBA loan
and that both the plaintiffs and the Bank signed the contract of sale to defendant of the Universal Leasing stock
pledged on the SBA loan (See Fact No. 7, STATEMENT
OF FACTS; R-241). Defendant alleged that he was not
told certain critical facts about Universal Leasing Corporation, which facts were in possession of the Bank, and
was not told that plaintiffs and the Bank officers were
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working together to have defendant purchase the said
stock (See R-151, 153, 550, 398, 673). Evidence supporting such claim was material to defendant's presentation
of his defense. The SBA loan application shows the substantial involvement of the plaintiffs and the Bank officers
in their common cause to have defendant pay off the loan.
Moreover, the SBA loan application is admissible on
several grounds:
1. Counsel for plaintiffs examined witnesses concerning the SBA loan application prior to any mention of
the same by defendant (R-31-36). It is an undisputed
rule of law that if a party opens the door by inquiring
into a particular matter, he is estopped from thereafter
shutting the door to that inquiry by the opposing party.
McCormick on Evidence states that " . . . one who induces
a trial court to let down the bars to a field of inquiry that
is not competent or relevant to the issues cannot complain
if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the
opening." McCormick on Evidence, Chapter 6, § 57, p.
132.
Counsel for both plaintiffs and the Bank opened the
subject of the SBA loan in their opening statements (R13, 16-17). Counsel for the plaintiffs inquired extensively
and in detail regarding the loan application, its preparation, the assets listed on the application as security for
the loan, and the filing of the application, prior to the
offer into evidence of the application by defendant's counsel (R-31-36). Even if the SBA loan application was incompetent or irrelevant, plaintiffs and the Bank should
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be estopped on this ground alone from objecting to its
admission.
2. The SBA loan application is relevant and material
to show the relationship between the plaintiff and the
Bank officers and that they had common cause in inducing the defendant to enter the transaction with the Souvails.
Defendant alleged in its "Answer to Intervenor's
Complaint & Counterclaim", that
" . . . the officers of and acting for intervening plaintiff, Zions First National Bank, who dealt with
defendant on or about February 17, 1970, . . . were
intimately involved as officers and/or agents in
other business ventures involving the other plaintiff and the Souvalls . . . that said officers were
working with and assisting said Souvalls and were
trying to induce defendant to purchase stock to
aid said Souvalls and so that intervenor's loan
would be paid back by defendant purchasing said
stock, which said stock said officers knew to be
worthless" (R-55-56).
Numerous pertinent and material facts required to
be disclosed in the SBA loan application were either
omitted completely or misstated. Said omissions are material and relevant to defendant's defense and counterclaim of fraud in that they establish a connection and
association between the plaintiffs and the Bank officers
and create strong and substantial inferences that both
plaintiffs and the Bank officers worked together in a
scheme or artifice or plan to dispose of the collateral of
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the SBA loan to defendant by "hook or by crook" (as
counsel for plaintiff stated (R-742)), to protect their
mutual business interests and to prevent the misstatements and omissions of the SBA loan application of Dinner Table and S & F Supply from being brought to light.
The omissions and misstatements were numerous, but the
following are sufficiently demonstrative:
ITEM TWO of "Applicant's Statement" of the SBA
loan application requires the declaration of all who assisted in the preparation of the application (Exhibit 7-D).
Mr. Souvall testified that both Mr. John Langeland and
Donald Bennett of the Bank assisted in the preparation
of the loan application. Their participation was not disclosed (R-88). ITEM THREE requires the disclosure of
officers and directors, etc., of the applicants (Exhibit
7-D). T. Bowering Woodbury, Vice-President of the
Bank, and Mr. John Langeland, Senior Vice-President
of the Bank, were stockholders, directors and members
of the Executive Committees of both the Dinner Table
and S & F Supply (R-28, 80, 83-84). None of these facts
were disclosed as required (R-144-145, Exhibit 7-D).
ITEM EIGHT of the SBA loan application requires the
disclosure of the use of the loan proceeds (Exhibit 7-D).
It was not disclosed that substantial amounts of the loan
proceeds went to pay off other personal and commercial
loans with the Bank (R-148).
These omissions show the inner involvement of plaintiffs and the Bank officers and indicate a mutual interest
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in working together to dispose of the assets by "hook or by
crook", to defendant.
3. The assets pledged under the SBA loan application are the same assets which the Souvalls were claiming
that defendant bought, and the said application would be
material and relevant to establish the identity and value
of said assets. Furthermore, the misstatements and omissions clearly demonstrate the propensity and capacity of
both plaintiffs and intervening plaintiff to misstate and
omit material facts and thus the document should have
been admitted to impeach the testimony of the plaintiff
Peter Souvall and the officers of the Bank.
It is a clear rule of evidence particularly in Utah that
"whatever to the ordinary reasoning mind is logically probative of a fact in issue is prima facie admissible and
should not be excluded unless its admission violates a rule
of law or policy. 29 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Evidence", § 251;
Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, 40 L. Ed. 237, 16 S. Ct. 62
(1895). Objections upon the ground of irrelevancy are
not favored for the reason that the force and effect of
circumstantial facts usually and almost necessarily depend upon their connection with each other. Moore v.
United States, 150 U. S. 57, 37 L. Ed. 996, 14 S, Ct. 26
(1893).
It is therefore submitted that Exhibit 7-D of the SBA
loan application was wrongfully excluded from evidence
for the reason that where the plaintiffs inquired into the
subject of the loan application they should be estopped
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from denying defendant from further examination regarding it. Plaintiffs' objection based on immateriality and
irrelevancy is clearly without merit. The application demonstrates the connection and common cause between
plaintiffs and the Bank's officers to have defendant
charged with the purchase of the collateral assets. The
loan application lists the assets which are the subject of
this dispute and places values on each. Furthermore, it
impeaches the testimony of plaintiffs and the Bank's
officers and demonstrates their propensity and capacity
to misstate or omit material facts.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
NUMBER 17 AND 19 WHEN IT FAILED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT LIABILITY
UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT CAN BE PREDICATED UPON
AN OMISSION AS OPPOSED TO A MERE
HALF-TRUTH.
Section 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act states as follows:
Any person who offers or sells a security by
means of an untrue statement of material fact or
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances in which they are made, not misleading, . . . is liable to the person buying the security from him who may sue either at law or at
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equity to recover the consideration paid for the
securities, . . . (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the clear language of the statute concerning omissions, cases construing identical language of
Federal law have made it clear that liability can be predicated upon a failure to disclose even where no representations at all are involved. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 112 (EDPA 1946), where the essence
of the complaint was the failure of the Buyer to disclose
to the Seller certain corporate facts known only to the
Buyer, which, if had been divulged to the Seller would
have resulted in a totally different situation. In Speed
v. Transarnerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (1951), recovery
was granted because of non-disclosure. Also see S.E.C.
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (1968); see
Gadsby, Business Organizations, Volume 11-A, § 5.03(1) (b) for an analysis of the development of the law in
this area. If there was liability only for false statements
and half-truths and not for omissions, then the law would
place a premium on taciturnity. (Gadsby, Page 5-15.)
Gadsby concludes that, "the Courts, in applying Rule
10(b) 5, [the language of which is the same as the language in the Utah Securities statute] have merely substituted for the requirement of scienter, the requirements
of the rule itself; that is that the representation made by
the defendant be false or that he stood silent when he
should have spoken." (Gadsby, Page 5-32).
In the instant case, the lower court cited the statute
and then stated that the statute related to misstatements
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of fact and half-truths. The statute itself clearly states
"omissions". On that basis alone the lower court's instructions are in error and clearly confusing, and may have
tended to mislead the Jury. In addition, the word "halftruth" is not used in the statute and is not an accurate
statement of the reasonable reading of the statute itself
as the cases construing similar language in the Federal
law have demonstrated.
The evidence is that the Bank's officer, Donald
Bennett, knew that one financial statement of Universal
Leasing was false, and he admitted he did not tell defendant (Exhibit 15-P, R-184-186, 663). The Bank officers
also knew that Universal Leasing was in poor financial
condition and did not tell defendant (R-151, 153, 673, 398400). Defendant was entitled to have the Jury consider
these omissions as violations of the Utah Securities Statute. The lower court's interpretation of the statute denied defendant this opportunity.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the Utah Statute is a recission statute and does not allow the Buyer to sue for
his expectation interest as does the federal rule, the
rationale for the Federal interpretation should be even
more rigorously applied to the Utah statute.
If the law were to be as the lower court set it forth
in the last paragraph of Instruction 17, then all one need
do to avoid liability under the statute would be to remain
absolutely silent. This Court has expressed its opinion
against this position in regards to common law fraud. See
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Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P. 2d 802 (1963).
The language of the statute itself as well as Federal case
law dictate that material omissions are actionable under
Section 61-1-22(1) (b).
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT I M P R O P E R L Y I N STRUCTED THE JURY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY DEFENSE AND
CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
FIRST: The defendant's defense of statutory fraud
against the plaintiffs and the Bank under Section 61-122(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act was completely removed from the consideration of the Jury by
the court's erroneous instructions. Even though the Souvalls omitted to reveal material facts to the defendant
about the financial condition of Universal Leasing, the
Jury was prevented from finding that the Souvalls were
liable under the statute because the court's instruction
did not allow them to consider omissions (see Argument
Point II above) (R-441).
The Jury was prevented from finding that the plaintiffs were liable for the conduct of the Bank officers, or
that there may have existed a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud, because the court refused to give an instruction on agency (see Argument Point I ) , and because the
instructions and the interrogatories to the Jury completely separated defendant's defense against the plain-
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tiffs from defendant's defense against the Bank (See Instructions 14, 18, 20, 31 and Interrogatories 11-25). Further, the court denied the defendant the right to amend
the pleadings for a separate statutory fraud action and
defense against the Bank.
The consequence of the foregoing is that all the Jury
could possibly find in defendant's favor was a commonlaw fraud defense against the Bank. Defendant was denied his defense of statutory fraud against plaintiffs and
the Bank.
Defendant pleaded in his answer to intervenor's complaint and counterclaim dated December 30, 1970, that
the officers of Zions First National Bank who dealt with
defendant on or about February 17, 1970, were "intimately involved as officers and/or agents in other business ventures involving the other plaintiff and the Souvalls mentioned in intervenor's complaint . . ." and, ". . .
that the said officers were working with and assisting the
said Souvalls and were trying to induce defendant to purchase said stock . . .". The evidence in the instant case
was clearly to the effect that the Bank was the agent of
the Souvalls (see Argument Point I above), and therefore liable under statutory fraud as their agent.
In addition to the possibility of liability of the Bank
as agent, defendant was entitled to a separate claim and
defense against the Bank based on statutory fraud under
Section 61-1-22(1) (b). After the evidence was in, defendant's counsel raised Rule 15b of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure to allow an independent claim against the Bank
of statutory fraud under Section 61-1-22. Rule 15b provides as follows:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause and
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial on these
issues . , . "
Defendant is entitled under the statute to a separate claim and defense against the Bank not involving its
agency. In omitting to give material information to defendant the Bank was acting on its own behalf as well
as for plaintiffs. The misrepresentations and non-disclosures in question under the statute were clearly those of
the Bank, as well as the Souvalls.
SECOND: Instructions 17, 18 and 21 are erroneous
in that they incorrectly state the burden and elements of
proof under the statute.
Instruction 17 places the burden upon the defendant
to show under statutory fraud that plaintiffs "knowingly
and willfully and with intent that defendant rely thereon
and be deceived thereby induced defendant to purchase"
(emphasis added), by an untrue material fact or halftruth.
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Not only is the instruction erroneous in the use of
the term "half-truth", but such a statement of the burden
of proof is certainly in error under Section 61-1-22(1) (b)
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The statute only
requires that the defendant ". . . not have known of the
untruth or omission . . ." Nowhere does the statute require defendant to show scienter, intent to deceive, reliance, or inducement. In Steven v. Vowells, 343 F. 2nd
374, at 379 (10th Cir. 1965), a case arising under Rule
10b5 of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Act of
1934, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically held
that "it is not necessary to allege or prove common law
fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule. It
is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions
such as a material misstatement of fact or the omission
to state a material fact." The court's instruction requires
defendant to show common law fraud under the statute
which is clearly erroneous.
Under Instruction 18, defendant should not be bound
by the elements of the burden of proof of common law
fraud in his action against intervening plaintiff for the
reasons stated in paragraph FIRST above.
Furthermore, Instruction 21, by creating a presumption that men are fair and honest in their dealings until
the contrary is clearly and convincingly proven by the
evidence to the contrary, conflicts with Instruction 31
which states that defendant must prove his defense
against plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.
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THIRD: The interrogatories which plaintiffs and
the Bank proposed to be submitted to the Jury in numerous instances were so phrased as to ask questions of fact
and questions of law in the same interrogatory denying
the Jury the right to make a separate judgment on each.
One such example will demonstrate: Interrogatory No.
3 asks: "Do you find that the defendant, S. Craig Hunter,
in order to induce the Bank to deliver stock, made a representation of a material fact?"
This single interrogatory asks the following questions:
1. Did defendant make a representation?
2. Was it material?
3. Was it made with intent to induce?
To a jury unschooled in the consequences of the law,
which of those three questions did they answer when they
answered Interrogatory No. 3.
Interrogatories 17 through 25 have to do with defendant's defense of fraud against the plaintiffs based upon
Section 61-1-22. Instructions 17 and 19 are repetitious in
that twice the Jury is asked whether it finds that the
plaintiffs made a representation of material fact to the
defendant.
Following Interrogatories 11-16, which cover the elements of common law fraud against the Bank, the Jury
is instructed that, "The burden is upon defendant to prove
each of the foregoing interrogatories by clear and con-
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vlneing evidence.5' A similar sentence follows Interrogatories 1-10, informing the Jury that the plaintiffs and intervener carried the burden of proving all the elements
of common law fraud against the defendant by "clear and
convincing evidence."
No such explanation of the burden of proof under
Section 61-1-22 follows Interrogatories 17 through 25.
Consequently, the Jury may have presumed that defendant's burden under the statute was "clear and convincing" rather than "a preponderance of the evidence."
Interrogatory 21 states, "Do you find that plaintiff
knew or should have known that Universal Leasing, Ltd.
was in very serious financial difficulty in February and
March of 1970?" In its context, and in the absence of an
explanation regarding the burden of proof of this point,
the Jury likely presumed that defendant carried the burden of proving this point when in fact plaintiffs carried
that burden as per the statute. Under the statute the
plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that they did not
or in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known
that Universal Leasing was in serious financial difficulty.
Interrogatory No. 22 is not material to defendant's
statutory defense of fraud. Defendant does not have to
show that plaintiffs in February and March of 1970 expected the stock of Universal Leasing, Ltd. to become
valueless within a short period of time. Its inclusion only
confuses the Jury further as to what must be shown under statutory fraud.
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Instruction No. 23 states, "Do you find that the defendant agreed to purchase the stock of Universal Leasing, Ltd. as a result of Plaintiffs' device, scheme, and artifice to defraud the defendant?" (Emphasis added.) For
the first time in the instructions and interrogatories the
term "device, scheme and artifice to defraud" is used in
lieu of "misstatement, or omission."
There is no instruction explaining that under the
statute, a material misstatement or omission may constitute a "device, scheme and artifice" to defraud. The Jury
had no way of knowing that a material misstatement or
omission may constitute a device, scheme or artifice to
defraud. By the inclusion of the conjunction "and", presumably defendant must prove all three.
Interrogatory No. 24 is repetitious of Interrogatory
No. 21, and from its context it appears that defendant
carried the burden of proving it, which is clearly not the
case under the statute.
Interrogatory No. 25 is wholly immaterial to defendant's defense of statutory fraud and should not have
been included in the Interrogatories. Its inclusion is only
confusing to the Jury.
Based on the error and unfairness that so extensively
affect the instructions and the interrogatories, there is
no way defendant's defense could be fairly submitted to
the Jury.
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POINT V.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
E R R O R IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIMS FOR FRAUD AGAINST
T H E PLAINTIFFS AND INTERVENING
PLAINTIFFS UPON THE BASIS THAT "NO
PROOF OF GENERAL DAMAGES OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE SHOWN."
Damages in this case are calculated according to Section 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
The statute is clearly a recission statute granting to
a purchaser of stock so harmed under the statute the
right to rescind and receive his restitution interest which
is the amount paid for the stock. Or, if the stock has
been sold, he may calculate his restitution interest by deducting from the amount paid, the amount received upon
the sale of the stock and sue for the difference plus interest.
Defendant tendered back the equivalent of 10,000
shares of Universal Leasing stock (R-156). The stock
taken out was lettered and the stock tendered back was
lettered, hence plaintiff and intervening plaintiff are put
in the same position they were before the sale (R-156).
Mr. Hunter testified he paid $9,000.00 for the stock
which constitutes damages under the statute (R-402).
He is entitled to an instruction to the Jury to that effect.
Defendant did not plead a set off. He pleaded statutory
fraud and damages thereunder (R-55-56). Without his
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counterclaims he is materially harmed in that he is not
allowed the right to seek a restitution of the consideration which he paid for the worthless stock.
Even though the lower court dismissed defendant's
counterclaims on the grounds of a failure to show damages, neither counsel for plaintiff nor counsel for intervening plaintiff ever asserted in their arguments for dismissal that no damages were shown by defendant (R725-761). In fact, counsel for intervening plaintiff admitted in his argument for dismissal that, "The facts are
in dispute..." (R-731).
The established rule in Utah requires the trial court
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the motion for dismissal is directed
and must resolve every controverted fact in his favor.
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Co., 123 Utah 387, 259
P. 2d 885, 887 (1953). It is not within the province of
the lower court to weigh or determine the preponderance
of the evidence when determining a motion to dismiss.
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491 (1952).
Defendant submitted evidence as to amounts paid for the
stock. Where counsel for the Bank admits that the facts
are in dispute, defendant is clearly entitled to an instruction, and Jury consideration of his counterclaims, and if
the Jury finds misconduct under the statute, to a restitution of the amounts paid for the stock.
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Respectfully submitted,
WALTER P. FABER, JR.
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
JOHN TAFT BENSON
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
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Post Office BIdg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 1st
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